

# Firms and Growth

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10th Sir Richard Stone Lecture

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## **1984 Nobel citation**

*for having made fundamental contributions to the development of systems of national accounts and hence greatly improved the basis for empirical economic analysis*

- ➊ Why *firms* and growth?
- ➋ Types of firm innovation?
  - ▶ creative destruction vs. new varieties vs. own innovation
- ➌ Which firms?
  - ▶ entrants vs. incumbents
  - ▶ fast-growing incumbents vs. slow-growing incumbents
- ➍ What shows up in official statistics?

Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019)

## **How Destructive is Innovation?**

Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow and Li (2019)

## **Missing Growth from Creative Destruction**


Hsieh and Klenow (2017)

## **The Reallocation Myth**

# Examples of creative destruction

- Mini-mills vs. integrated steel mills
- Wal-Mart vs. K-Mart, Sears
- Apple/Samsung vs. Blackberry/Nokia
- Amazon vs. Borders, Circuit City
- Uber vs. taxi companies
- Google vs. newspapers

# NETFLIX VS. BLOCKBUSTER (2004-2010)



# Examples of own innovation by incumbents

- New car model years
- Generations of Intel microprocessors
- Successive versions of Apple iPhones
- Hospitals reducing mortality by introducing checklists
- Big Pharma?





# Why do we care which firms drive growth?

- spillovers may be bigger from entrants
- entrants may face financial constraints
- business stealing from creative destruction
  - ▶ see Atkeson and Burstein (2019)

## ① Why *firms* and growth?

## ② Types of firm innovation?

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## ③ Which firms?

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## ④ What shows up in official statistics?

$$Y = K^{\alpha} (A \cdot H)^{1-\alpha} \Rightarrow \frac{Y}{L} = \left( \frac{K}{Y} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{H}{L} \right) \cdot A$$

- $Y = \text{GDP}$
- $K = \text{physical capital}$
- $H = \text{human capital}$
- $L = \text{worker hours}$
- $\alpha = \text{elasticity of output wrt } K$
- $Y/L = \text{labor productivity}$
- $A = \text{Total Factor Productivity (TFP)}$

# U.S. growth accounting

	$Y/L$	$A$
<b>1948–2017</b>	<b>2.34%</b>	<b>1.95%</b>
1948–1973	3.28	3.21
1974–1995	1.55	0.81
1996–2005	3.08	2.58
2006–2017	1.21	0.90

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)

# Possible drivers of U.S. TFP growth

Human capital?

BLS already netted it out, albeit imperfectly


Allocative efficiency?

Evidence is limited to manufacturing and Compustat firms

Firm-led innovation

This is promising and will be my focus

# Allocative efficiency in U.S. manufacturing



Source: Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2018)

# Segue on allocative efficiency and development

Allocative efficiency *does* appear to be important for:

- levels of development
  - ▶ China, India, Mexico vs. the U.S.
- transitional growth
  - ▶ China, Spain, Eastern Europe


## References

Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2014)

Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013)

Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, Villegas-Sanchez (2017)

# U.S. vs. Indian allocative efficiency



Source: Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2018)



# Evidence on firm-level innovation

- Patents and R&D?
- TFP growth decompositions?
- My approach: market shares

Manufacturing share of:

Patents	90%
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R&D	69%
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GDP	12%
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TFP growth	11%
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Sources: USPTO, NSF, BEA, BLS

Shares are in 2012 except for TFP growth (1987–2014)

# TFP growth decompositions

- TFP of entering vs. exiting firms
- Reallocation of inputs from low to high TFP surviving firms
- TFP growth within surviving firms

Atheoretical (which is both good and bad!)

Need output and input data so limited to manufacturing in the U.S.


Lack of firm-level deflators (unit prices do not reflect quality, variety)

# My approach: market shares

Use employment as a proxy for sales (market share).

## **The key idea:**


- Entrant employment share reflects entrant innovation
- If survivors innovate, they add workers
- If creative destruction, thick tails for firm job growth
- If own innovation, modest employment gains




# *Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)*

- U.S. Census micro data on firms and plants
- All firms with paid employees (excludes sole proprietors)
- All sectors other than agriculture, government
- Covers  $> 80\%$  of all employment
- 1983–2013 and decades within

# Job creation and destruction in the U.S. LBD



# Exit rate by firm size



Source: U.S. Census of Manufacturing



$$Y = \left[ \sum_{j=1}^M (q_j y_j)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$y_j = l_j = \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma-1} L W^{1-\sigma} q_j^{\sigma-1}$$

$$L_f \equiv \sum_{j \in M_f} l_j = \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma-1} L W^{1-\sigma} \sum_{j \in M_f} q_j^{\sigma-1}$$

$$W \propto Y/L = M^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{q_j^{\sigma-1}}{M} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

# Arrival rates of innovation

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Own-variety improvements by incumbents	$\lambda_i$
Creative destruction by entrants	$\delta_e$
Creative destruction by incumbents	$\delta_i$
New varieties from entrants	$\kappa_e$
New varieties from incumbents	$\kappa_i$

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The average step size for quality improvements for own innovation  $s_\lambda$  and creative destruction  $s_\delta$  are both  $s_q = \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - (\sigma - 1)} \right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)} \geq 1$ . New varieties are drawn from the quality distribution of existing products times  $s_\kappa$ .

quality level


$q$

0


firm  $j$  (3 initial varieties)

$M_t$


quality level




quality level



quality level



quality level




Two ways of decomposing the gross growth rate  $(1 + g)^{\sigma-1}$ :

$$1 + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} (\kappa_e + \kappa_i)}_{\text{new varieties}} + \underbrace{(s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) \lambda_i}_{\text{own innovation}} + \underbrace{(s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) (\tilde{\delta}_e + \tilde{\delta}_i)}_{\text{creative destruction}}$$


$$1 + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} \kappa_e + (s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) \tilde{\delta}_e}_{\text{entrants}} + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} \kappa_i + (s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) (\lambda_i + \tilde{\delta}_i)}_{\text{incumbents}}$$



## Model JC/JD with *only* Creative Destruction



# Model JC/JD with *only* Own Innovation



- ➊ Why *firms* and growth?
- ➋ **Types of firm innovation?**
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# Sources of U.S. TFP growth, 1983–2013

	basis points per year	% of growth
Own Innovation	115	65%
Creative Destruction	46	26%
New Varieties	16	9%
All sources	176	100%

Estimates from Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019)

# Sources of the U.S. speedup and slowdown

Basis points per year

	1983–1993	1993–2003	2003–2013
Creative Destruction	44	64	29
New Varieties	23	19	6
Own Innovation	99	147	98

- ➊ Why *firms* and growth?
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## Entrants and gazelles drive job creation ...

Employment growth	% of gross job creation	% of net job creation
Entrants	50%	800%
Incumbents > 20%	13%	208%

Source: Hsieh and Klenow (2017) from LBD 2003–2013

## ... but not TFP growth

Employment growth	% of gross job creation	% of TFP growth
Entrants	50%	13%
Incumbents > 20%	13%	4%
Incumbents 0 to 20%	37%	65%
Incumbents < 0%	0%	18%

Source: Hsieh and Klenow (2017) from LBD 2003–2013



# Young firms vs. Old firms

	<u>% of Job Creation</u>	<u>% of TFP Growth</u>
Age < 1	31%	9%
Age 1–5	13%	14%
Age 5–10	11%	14%
Age 10–15	9%	12%
Age > 15	36%	51%

Source: Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019)

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- ➍ **What shows up in official statistics?**

Creative destruction is a key source of growth

- See the survey by Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014)
- 26% of growth in Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019)

Does it show up in *measured* growth?

- standard measurement assumes new producers have the *same* quality-adjusted price as producers they replace
- but creative destruction  $\Rightarrow$  new producers have a *lower* quality-adjusted price

# Numerical example

- 80% of items: 4% inflation (no innovation)
- 10% of items: -6% inflation (innovation w/o CD)
- 10% of items: -6% inflation (CD)
- True inflation = 2%, True growth = 2%
- Imputed inflation due to CD =  $\frac{8}{9} \cdot 4\% + \frac{1}{9} \cdot (-6\%) = 2.9\%$
- Measured growth = 1.1%, Missing Growth = 0.9%

# Our questions

- 1 How much is U.S. growth understated, on average, because of creative destruction?
- 2 Has such “missing growth” increased in recent years?

- 1 How much is U.S. growth understated, on average, because of imputation for creative destruction?

~ **0.5 ppt per year** between 1983–2013

- 2 Has “missing growth” increased a lot in recent years?

**No**

# Missing growth with Cobb-Douglas aggregation

Sources of bias from Creative Destruction:

$$(\delta_e + \delta_i) \left\{ \underbrace{(1 - \hat{\lambda}_i) \log \hat{s}_\lambda}_{\text{not all incumbents innovate}} + \underbrace{\log s_\delta - \log \hat{s}_\lambda}_{\text{different stepsize for CD}} \right\}$$

CES demand  $\Rightarrow$  market share isoelastic with respect to price

$$\text{Missing Growth} = \left( \frac{S_{I_t,t+1}}{S_{I_t,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

$S_{I_t,t}$  = market share in  $t$  of all goods sold in both  $t$  and  $t + 1$

$S_{I_t,t+1}$  = market share in  $t + 1$  of all goods sold in  $t$  &  $t + 1$

**Shrinking share of non-CD goods  $\Rightarrow$  missing growth**



*If* existing plants carry out OI but not CD or NV:

$$\text{Missing Growth} = \left( \frac{S_{I_t,t+1}}{S_{I_t,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

$S_{I_t,t}$  =  $t$  share of all establishments operating in  $t$  and  $t + 1$

$S_{I_t,t+1}$  =  $t + 1$  share of all establishments operating in  $t$  and  $t + 1$

# Missing growth implied by survivor employment shares

basis points per year

<b>1983–2013</b>	<b>54</b>
1983–1995	52
1996–2005	48
2006–2013	65

# Adding in the Missing Growth

basis points per year

	<b>Measured</b>	<b>“True”</b>
1983–2013	187	241
1983–1995	180	232
1996–2005	268	316
2006–2013	98	163

# Sectors contributing to Missing Growth

Hotels & Restaurants	34%
Retail Trade	29%
Professional services	9%
⋮	
Manufacturing	2%

# Why do we care if some growth is missed?

- business stealing
- relating growth to policy
- whether ideas are getting harder to find (Gordon, Jones)
- how many people are better off than their parents (Chetty)
- setting the Fed's inflation target
- indexing Social Security and tax brackets


Focused on U.S. growth today

But issues are just as relevant for other countries:

- Firms everywhere are innovating and growing (or not)
  - ▶ See India and Mexico vs. the U.S.
- Same issues arise with growth statistics outside the U.S.

## Age shall wither them

Index of employee numbers at average company  
Employment at company's birth=1



Source: World Bank

- How big are externalities?
  - ▶ entrants vs. incumbents
  - ▶ domestic vs. international
- Sources of firm-level innovation outside the U.S.?
- Missing growth outside the U.S.?
- Reasons for declining dynamism and growth?
- Creative destruction, trade, and inequality?