

# Firms and Growth

Pete Klenow

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Kuznets Lecture

Yale University

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*for his empirically founded interpretation of economic growth, which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic and social structure and process of development*

– citation for the 1971 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics

**1980's** Endogenous growth models (CRS)

- Romer (1986), Lucas (1988)

**1990's** Endogenous growth models (IRS)

- Romer (1990), Aghion-Howitt (1991), Kortum (1997)

**1990's** Cross-country empirics

- Barro (1990), Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1992), Hall-Jones (1998)

**Problem:** Little interaction with micro data

# More recent growth research

**2000's** Institutions, Directed Technological Change, Trade


- Acemoglu (various), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003)

**2010's** Firm Dynamics, Inequality, Trade

- Acemoglu, Aghion, Akcigit, **Arkolakis**, Atkeson, Atkin, Bernard, Bloom, Buera, Burstein, **Caliendo**, **Chevalier**, Costinot, David, Davis, De Loecker, Donaldson, Gabaix, **Goldberg**, Haltiwanger, Holmes, Hopenhayn, Hsieh, Jarmin, Jensen, Jones, Jovanovic, **Karlan**, **Kortum**, Lagakos, Lucas, Luttmer, Melitz, Midrigan, Miranda, **Mobarak**, Moll, Muendler, Oberfield, Perla, **Peters**, Redding, Restuccia, Rodriguez-Clare, Rogerson, Rossi-Hansberg, Schmitz, **Schott**, Syverson, Tonetti, Van Reenen, **Udry**, Venky, Waugh, Wright, Xu ...

**Fuel:** Healthy interaction with micro data

## Share of EconLit papers about "Growth"



- ➊ Why firms and growth?
- ➋ Which firms and how?
  - ▶ entrants vs. incumbents
  - ▶ own innovation vs. creative destruction vs. new varieties
- ➌ Which contributions show up in official statistics?

$$Y = K^{\alpha} (A \cdot H)^{1-\alpha} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{Y}{L} = \left( \frac{K}{Y} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{H}{L} \right) \cdot A$$

	$g_{Y/L}$	$g_A$
<hr/>		
1948–2016	2.36%	1.98%
1948–1973	3.28	3.20
1974–1995	1.55	0.84
1996–2005	3.10	2.69
2006–2016	1.19	0.80

Human capital?

BLS tries to net it out, but imperfectly

Allocative efficiency?


Evidence is limited to manufacturing (see next slide)

Firm-led innovation

This is promising and will be my focus



# U.S. allocative efficiency



Source: Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017)


# Segue on allocative efficiency and development

Allocative efficiency *does* appear to be important for:

- levels of development
  - ▶ China, India, Mexico vs. the U.S.
- transitional growth
  - ▶ China, Spain, Eastern Europe

Sources: Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2014), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013), Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas-Sanchez (2016)

# U.S. vs. Indian allocative efficiency



Source: Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017)

# Evidence on firm-level innovation

- Patents and R&D?
- Accounting decompositions *a la* Haltiwanger?
- Indirect inference using firm employment

Manufacturing share of:

Patents	90%
R&D	69%
GDP	12%
TFP growth	11%

Sources: USPTO, NSF, BEA, BLS

Shares are in 2012 except for TFP growth (1987–2014)

# Accounting decompositions?

Using plant-level or firm-level data:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{Y/L} = & \text{Entrants} - \text{Exiters} \\ & + \text{Reallocation among survivors} \\ & + \text{Growth within survivors} \end{aligned}$$

Atheoretical (both good and bad)

Limited to manufacturing because need output data

*Longitudinal Business Database* covers  $> 80\%$  of employment

Employment as a proxy for market share and innovation:

- Entrant employment share reflects entrant innovation
- If survivors innovate, they add workers
- If creative destruction, thick tails for firm job growth
- If own innovation, modest employment gains

Total Apple Employees



Rectangular Snip

Jobs Returns



iPod Launches



iPhone Launches



iPad Launches



1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Year

55K

50K

45K

40K

35K

30K

25K

20K

15K

10K

5K

0K



# Next borrow heavily from two papers


Klette and Kortum (2004)

## **Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation**


Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2016)

## **How Destructive is Innovation?**


quality level




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
quality level



quality level



quality level



$$Y = \left[ \sum_{j=1}^M (q_j y_j)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$y_j = l_j = \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma-1} L W^{1-\sigma} q_j^{\sigma-1}$$

$$L_f \equiv \sum_{j \in M_f} l_j = \left( \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma-1} L W^{1-\sigma} \sum_{j \in M_f} q_j^{\sigma-1}$$

$$W \propto Y/L = M^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^M \frac{q_j^{\sigma-1}}{M} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

# Arrival rates of innovation

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Own-variety improvements by incumbents	$\lambda_i$
Creative destruction by entrants	$\delta_e$
Creative destruction by incumbents	$\delta_i$
New varieties from entrants	$\kappa_e$
New varieties from incumbents	$\kappa_i$

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The average step size for quality improvements for own innovation and creative destruction, weighted by employment, is  $s_q = \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - (\sigma - 1)} \right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)} \geq 1$ . New varieties are drawn from the quality distribution of existing products times  $s_\kappa$ .




# Firm-led innovation and growth

Two ways of decomposing the gross growth rate  $(1 + g)$ :


$$\left( 1 + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} (\kappa_e + \kappa_i)}_{\text{new varieties}} + \underbrace{(s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) \lambda_i}_{\text{own innovation}} + \underbrace{(s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) (\tilde{\delta}_e + \tilde{\delta}_i)}_{\text{creative destruction}} - \delta_o \psi \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$\left( 1 + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} \kappa_e + (s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) \tilde{\delta}_e}_{\text{entrants}} + \underbrace{s_{\kappa} \kappa_i + (s_q^{\sigma-1} - 1) (\lambda_i + \tilde{\delta}_i)}_{\text{incumbents}} - \delta_o \psi \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$


# Model JC/JD with *only* Creative Destruction




# Model exit by size with *only* Creative Destruction




## Model JC/JD with *only* Own Innovation




# Data JC/JD in the U.S. LBD




# Employment per firm, young vs. old – in the U.S. LBD



## Exit rate, small vs. large firms – in the U.S. LBD



## Sources of Product Innovation, 2003–2013





# Sources of growth

<b>1976–1986</b>	Entrants	Incumbents	Total
Creative destruction	19.1%	8.2%	27.3%
New varieties	0.0%	7.6%	7.6%
Own-variety improvements	-	65.1%	65.1%
Total	19.1%	80.9%	100%

<b>2003–2013</b>	Entrants	Incumbents	Total
Creative destruction	12.5%	6.4%	18.9%
New varieties	0.3%	4.1%	4.4%
Own-variety improvements	-	76.7%	76.7%
Total	12.8%	87.2%	100%

# Why do we care which firms drive growth?

- spillovers may be bigger from entrants
- entrants may face financial constraints
- business stealing from creative destruction
  - ▶ see Atkeson and Burstein (2016)

Broda and Weinstein (2010)

## **Product Creation and Destruction**

Erickson and Pakes (2011)

## **An Experimental Component Index for the CPI**

Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow and Li (2017)

## **Missing Growth from Creative Destruction**

CD is a key source of growth in many models

- See the survey by Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014)
- Yet GHK find a modest role for CD

Does CD show up in *measured* growth?

- standard measurement assumes new producers have the *same* quality-adjusted price as producers they replace
- but creative destruction  $\Rightarrow$  new producers have a *lower* quality-adjusted price

# Numerical example

- 80% of items: 4% inflation (no innovation)
- 10% of items: -6% inflation (innovation w/o CD)
- 10% of items: -6% inflation (CD)
- True inflation = 2%, True growth = 2%
- Imputed inflation due to CD =  $\frac{8}{9} \cdot 4\% + \frac{1}{9} \cdot (-6\%) = 2.9\%$
- Measured growth = 1.1%, Missing Growth = 0.9%

- 1 How much is U.S. growth understated, on average, because of creative destruction?
- 2 Has such “missing growth” increased in recent years?

# Imputation in the CPI, 1988–2004

- 3.9% monthly exit rates of products
- 48% of the product substitutions “noncomparable”
- So 22.5% average annual “true” exit
- Noncomparable item substitutions:
  - ▶ 31% direct quality adjustments (mostly same producer products)
  - ▶ 69% linking or class-mean forms of imputation

2.3% monthly exit rate (Nakamura & Steisson 2008)

## Missing prices

*If no price report from a participating company has been received in a particular month, the change in the price of the associated item will, in general, be estimated by averaging the price changes for the other items within the same cell (i.e., for the same kind of products) for which price reports have been received.*

– BLS Handbook of Methods (2015, ch. 14, p. 10)



Sources of bias from CD:

$$\underbrace{\lambda_d (1 - \hat{\lambda}_i) \log \hat{\gamma}_i}_{\text{not all incumbents innovate}} + \underbrace{\lambda_d (\log \gamma_d - \log \hat{\gamma}_i)}_{\text{different stepsize for CD}}$$

# How we deviate from Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow

- GHK assume measured growth = true growth
- We argue that CD and NV are missed
- Our indirect inference differs as a result
- We infer more true growth, higher step sizes

Percentage points per year

1976–1986	0.52%
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from CD	0.41%
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2003–2013	0.42%
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from CD	0.33%
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# Measured vs. True growth

	Measured	“True”
1976–1986	1.03%	1.55%
2003–2013	1.44%	1.86%

# Why do we care if some growth is missed?


- business stealing
- relating growth to policy
- whether ideas are getting harder to find (Gordon, Jones)
- how many people are better off than their parents (Chetty et al.'s Fading American Dream)
- setting the Fed's inflation target
- indexing Social Security and tax brackets

Focused on U.S. growth today

But issues are just as relevant for other countries:

- Firms everywhere are innovating / imitating / adopting
  - ▶ See India and Mexico vs. the U.S.
- Same issues arise with growth statistics in OECD and beyond

## Growth in Average Plant Employment over the Life Cycle



Sources: Employment growth imputed from 1992 and 1997 US Manufacturing Census, 1998 and 2003 Mexican Economic Census, and 1994-1995 to 2010-2011 ASI-NSS (India).

- How big are externalities?
  - ▶ entrants vs. incumbents
  - ▶ domestic vs. international
- Sources of firm-level innovation outside the U.S.?
- Reasons for declining dynamism and growth?
- Creative destruction, trade, and inequality?
- Missing growth outside the U.S.?